When a secret reserve price is used in an auction, the auctioneer cannot guarantee that the good can be sold out at the auction, and can re-auction the unsold objects in the next round.
Introduction
This paper is motivated by an interesting feature we observed from the procurement auctions organized by the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT): many of these auctions are held with multiple rounds. This feature is attributed to the use of secret reserve prices in these auctions. Prior research has indicated that auctions with reserve prices sometimes lead to no transaction if no bidder can propose a price better than the reserve price. 1 However, there are still chances of trade if bidders'values for the unsold objects change. Thus the seller can continue auctioning the unsold objects from previous auctions. Previous research, however, has not paid much attention to this feature in auctions. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic bidding model in multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices and evaluate how the release of the auctioneer's reserve price a¤ects bidders'bidding behavior and auctioneer's expected payment.
Then we carry out a structural econometric analysis on the multi-round procurement auction data from the INDOT. Using the structural estimates, we evaluate how the release of the reserve price a¤ects the government's expected payment through counterfactual analysis.
To model the multiple stages and secret reserve price, we focus our …rst-price sealed-bid auction model on a simple environment -the independent private value (IPV) paradigm. We also restrict our attention to bidders'strategic changes over stages, while assuming that the government's reserve price is exogenous and private over stages. 2 This assumption, although restrictive, is consistent with our data. 3 While our model focuses on the procurement auctions that are low-bid auctions, as it is motivated by the procurement data from the INDOT, it can be readily extended to high-bid auctions. Our model yields some interesting predictions and implications. First, the bidding prices uniformly 1 See, for example, Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1997) , Bajari and Hortasu (2003) , and Li and Perrigne (2003) . 2 The theoretical study of the seller's optimal reserve price strategy is often in a relatively simple environment. See e.g., Riley and Samuelson (1981) and La¤ont and Maskin (1980) . The empirical study of auction data in complicated environment, on the other hand, often treats the seller's reserve exogenous and concentrates on analyzing bidding. See e.g., Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) 's study of eBay auctions with reserve prices and endogenous entry, and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003)'s study of repeated games of highway auctions. 3 According to the o¢ cials at the INDOT, generally no change is made in the engineer estimate (as the reserve price) after a round of unsuccessful auction and in practice there were very few changes made. Hence the reserve price is the government's knowledge rather than its dynamic strategy.
decline over stages, because of the information about the secret reserve prices revealed in the previous stage. Second, under some conditions, hiding the secret reserve price is better for the government than announcing it. This result provides an explanation as to why secret reserve prices are commonly used in auctions from a new perspective.
Note that use of secret reserve prices in auctions has been studied in empirical work. See, e.g., Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994) for the Outer Continental Shelf auctions, Ashenfelter (1989) for wine and arts auctions, Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1994, 1997) and Li and Perrigne (2003) for timber auctions, and Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) for eBay auctions. Theoretical work in studying secret reserve prices, however, has been limited, with exceptions such as Vincent (1995) using risk aversion to explain the use of secret reserve prices in a common value paradigm and Li and Tan (2000) in an independent private value paradigm. They show that in the presence of risk aversion, using a secret reserve price is better for the seller than using the optimal public reserve price for single-round auctions under some conditions. Alternative explanations have also been provided through the seller's objectives other than maximizing pro…ts such as maximizing the expected sales as in Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) . 4 On the other hand, studies of multi-round auctions have been quite limited. Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1997) study a two-round auction game where the …rst round is conducted as a …rst-price sealed bid auction with a secret reserve price, and if the object is not sold, the second round is conducted through bargaining between the seller and the bidder with the highest bid from the …rst round. Horstmann and LaCasse (1997) propose a common value second-price bidding model in which the seller is assumed to know the true common value and has the option of holding the auction for a one-time resale. The seller announces a reserve price for screening inferior bids but does not guarantee a sale in the …rst round auction. Evidently, these two models do not …t with the multi-round procurement auctions organized by the INDOT as these auctions can be held for more than two rounds if the project is not sold in the previous round, and the government does not strategically choose to re-auction the project.
To analyze the procurement auction data, and in addition to provide an empirical framework 4 Hiding reserve prices may also help the auctioneer deter collusion from bidders as explained in Ashenfelter (1989) .
In addition, as argued in Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) , secret reserve prices may be used to encourage participation in auctions with entry.
within which the multi-round model with secret reserve prices can be analyzed, we develop a structural model from the theoretical model that we propose. Our structural approach takes into account of the unobserved auction heterogeneity, the existence of which in procurement auctions has been documented (e.g. Krasnokutskaya (2002) and Li and Zheng (2005) ). Failing to control for the unobserved auction heterogeneity can cause severe bias in structural estimation, and hence result in misleading policy evaluations and recommendations.
We adopt the method of simulated moments (MSM) to estimate the underlying structural parameters. This approach provides a uni…ed framework within which some interesting hypotheses can be tested, in addition to the computational advantage in obtaining consistent estimates. For example, we can test whether the private cost distribution varies across stages. We use our structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. Using the structural estimates, we carry out a counterfactual analysis by simulating the auctions with di¤erent government's reserve price release policies in the multi-round scenario. We …nd that the government could save more than $13,000 (or about 2.5%
of the project value) on average on a representative bridge work auction by hiding the engineer estimate rather than disclosing it. Hence the use of secret reserve price may be a good policy in practice in procurement auctions.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data to motivate the model. In Section 3, we construct the model of multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices, and solve the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We also investigate the implications from our model. In Section 4, we compare the e¤ects of di¤erent information release policies. In Section 5, we conduct a reduced-form econometric analysis of the data. In Section 6, we provide a structural econometric framework for analyzing multi-round auction data. In Section 7, we apply the structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. In Section 8, we use counterfactual analysis to evaluate the government's reserve price policy. Section 9 concludes. All technical proofs are included in the Appendix.
Data
This paper analyzes a data set of highway auctions held by the INDOT. The INDOT lets highway construction contracts through auctions. The auctions are held as …rst-price sealed-bid auctions where the INDOT reserve prices are unknown to bidders. Each contract speci…es the construction work on highways within Indiana State undertaken by the winner of the auction. The winner of each auction performs projects described in the contract and is paid by the government. The prices bid by all participants are the amount that they ask for compensation.
An auction proceeds as follows. The INDOT posts the notice to contractors to invite bids …ve weeks prior to the bidding day. The notice includes simple information such as the type of projects in each contract, date of completion requested, and the length or area of the projects. Bid proposals and plans for the contracts that consist of more information on characteristics of the projects are also available upon request. Next with the advent of the bidding day, each bidder submits a sealed bid to an electronic bidding system under the government's secret reserve price. Finally on the bidding day, the received bids are unsealed and ranked by the government publicly. If the lowest bid in the auction is lower than the reserve price, the contract is then awarded to the bidder. Otherwise the contract will be readvertised and reauctioned in the following month. This feature makes the data unique.
The INDOT lets four types of construction work: road work, bridge work, tra¢ c facilities and highway maintenance. We select one speci…c type of bridge work, which is called bridge rehabilitation, to analyze for two reasons. First, there exists large heterogeneity across di¤erent auctions. The characteristics of bridges are relatively more observable to econometricians among all work. Second, among all bridge work, bridge rehabilitation work reveals most characteristics to econometricians and occurs most frequently.
The sample analyzed in this paper is from INDOT monthly lettings from September 1996 to December 2004. For each auctioned contract, we have the following observations: the identity of each bidder, all bids, the reserve price, the number of bidders, the number of projects, the length of projects, the number of working days (or the completion date), the DBE goal and the structure of the bridge. 5 Before we exclude the lettings whose descriptive variables are missing, we have 37 5 DBE (short for disadvantaged business enterprise program) is committed by the INDOT to implement to ensure nondiscrimination in the award and administration of USDOT-assisted contracts. DBE goal is expressed as a percentage. This percentage, when applied to the total federal highway construction funds received by the INDOT during the year, represents the amount of dollars that DBE …rms working on INDOT contracts as prime contractors, subcontractors, or truckers should receive. Hence in a particular letting, the primary contractor if not a DBE …rm, has the responsibility for contracting all ready, willing and able DBE …rms who express a desire to work on any of the pay items of the contract; and must subcontract at least as much as the required percentage of the total value to lettings that have two rounds of auctions. In a majority of 34 lettings, the contractors in the second round are a subset of the contractors in the …rst round. There are three lettings, however, all of which have one single bidder in the …rst round and one new single bidder in the second round.
We exclude them from our sample. We also exclude from the sample the lettings whose descriptive variables are missing. As a result, our …nal sample consists of 273 lets and 1428 bids in total. Among the 273 lets, 243 were sold in the …rst round that involve 1261 bids. There are 30 lets unsold in the …rst round (near 12.5%) but sold in the second round with totally 167 bids in both rounds, and 102 bids in the …rst round, and 65 bids in the second round, respectively. Table 1 and Table 2 give the description of the variables and the summary statistics of the data. On average, DBE percentage is 7.52 which means 7.52% of the total value of the contract is operated by DBE …rms. DBE is regulated by the government hence it is not the choice of bidders.
The average number of working days for completing the bridge work is around 138. The average length of the projects is 79.21 meters (about 260 feet). Intuitively, the longer a project takes and/or the longer the bridge is, the more work needs to be done and hence the higher cost it could result in. The average number of projects in each contract is 1.18, meaning that there can be multiple projects on vicinity sites. Multiple projects could potentially a¤ect the capacity as well as the share ability of the facilities of the …rms. 38% of the bridges have a steel structure, with the rest having structures of concrete, wood and others.
The summary statistics also reveal several important features of the data. On average, the number of bidders in the …rst round is 4.99 whereas the number of bidders in the second round is 2.23. Second, the average reserve price is $855,615 and the average bid is $839,506 for those with only one round. The former is greater than the latter meaning that the secret reserve price is e¤ectively binding. On the other hand, they are very close. Third, if we concentrate on the auctions with two rounds, we …nd that on average, the bid is $ 638,917 in the …rst round and $588,992 in the second round, with a di¤erence of $49,925. This indicates that bids on average are lower in the second round than in the …rst round.
one or more DBE …rms.
The Model for Multi-Round Auctions with Secret Reserve Prices
In this section, we propose a game-theoretic model for multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices, and derive the corresponding Bayesian-Nash equilibrium.
Setup of the Game
The government lets a single and indivisible contract to …rm contractors. There are N potential contractors who are interested in bidding for the contract. Each potential bidder is risk-neutral with a disutility equal to his private cost c. The government has an engineer estimate that is kept secret and serves as a reserve price in that the lowest bid has to be below it to become the winning bid. Because of the secret reserve price, it is possible for a project not to be awarded in an auction.
If this is the case, the project will be re-auctioned later. Thus the game has multiple stages.
The government's secret reserve price r 0 is drawn from a distribution G( ) with support [c; c] where c 0: G( ) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and has a density g( ) that is strictly positive on the support. Potential bidders draw their private costs independently at stage j from a common distribution denoted F j ( ) with support [c; c] and the corresponding density f j ( ) that is strictly positive on the support. 6 Thus we focus on the independent private value paradigm. When forming his bid, each bidder knows his private cost c, but does not know r 0 as well as others' private costs. On the other hand, each bidder knows that r 0 is drawn from G( ) and all private costs are independently drawn from F j ( ). G( ) and F j ( ) are common knowledge to all bidders. As a result, all bidders are identical a priori and the game is symmetric.
More speci…cally, the game can be characterized in the following order. In the …rst stage, the government has an engineer estimate that serves as the reserve price. The reserve price is kept …xed and secret until the contract is sold. It is exogenous in that it is not related to the government's optimal and strategic decision. As a result, we can focus on the strategic changes of the bidders' strategies across stages. Without knowing the reserve price, all N potential bidders participate in the game in the …rst stage and submit their bids. At the end of the …rst stage, all bids are opened, ranked and released. The reserve price, however, is not made public until after the contract is sold out. If the lowest bid, which requests the least compensation of cost from the government, is 6 While we assume that G( ) and Fj( ) have a common support for simplicity, our approach can be readily generalized to the general case where G( ) and Fj( ) have di¤erent supports.
lower than the reserve price, the contract is awarded to the associated bidder and the game ends.
Otherwise, the game continues to the next stage.
In the second stage, there are two main changes. First, each contractor re-draws his private cost from a common distribution F 2 ( ), which in general can be di¤erent from F 1 ( ); his re-drawn cost is independent of his cost from the preceding stage. This is a key assumption in our model, and will be labeled as the "random cost replacement" assumption hereafter. This assumption implies each bidder's cost in one auction round is independent of his in another. Being endowed with the lowest cost in the …rst round does not mean being endowed with the lowest in other rounds. This assumption can be used to justify our observation that in most of the auctions in our data, the actual bidders of the second round are a subset of the bidders in the …rst round. Moreover, the assumption that each bidder re-draws his private cost in a di¤erent round is reasonable. Each …rm can participate in several di¤erent auctions in one month. They may lose in some auctions while winning in others. In a later round, the …rm's private cost for the same project can change from the previous round because the …rm may face di¤erent capacity constraints and may have di¤erent opportunity costs. 7
Another important feature of our model is that there is a Bayesian updating on the reserve price from the bidders. Speci…cally, when an unsold project is re-auctioned, though the engineer's estimate is still kept secret, bidders have more information about this secret reserve price in this round than in the preceding one as they know the lowest bid from the preceding round. Therefore, they take this lowest bid into their strategy calculation as additional information as they know the secret reserve price has to be below this lowest bid. If a potential bidder's private cost he re-draws in this new round is above the lowest bid from the preceding round, he will not submit his bid.
Thus this lowest bid plays a similar role to that of a public reserve price in screening bids. Thus, though we assume that there is no entry problem in the …rst round in that all potential bidders submit their bids, in the subsequent rounds, a potential bidder will not submit his bid if his private cost is higher than the lowest bid he observes from the preceding round. As a result, the actual bidders in the subsequent rounds must be a subset of the potential bidders of the …rst round.
7 Statistical tests we perform in the data o¤er support for the random replacement assumption. The correlation of the ranks of the bidders in the …rst round and in the second round is about 0.30. Further test of the correlation of same bidders'bids across auction rounds shows that the correlation is 0.17.
The Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium Bidding Strategy
Denote a bidder's cost at the j-th stage c j ; and the associated bidding strategy b j : We focus on the symmetric increasing Bayesian-Nash bidding equilibrium. De…ne the equilibrium bidding function
We also use s j to denote the lowest bid in the j-th stage.
In this paper, we assume that bidders solve their bidding strategies stage by stage without considering possible future rounds at the current round. 8 Under this assumption and the random cost replacement assumption, we can derive the bidder's Bayesian-Nash equilibrium across stages as follows.
Proposition 1
The Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies are
for the …rst round and
for the j-th reauction round respectively.
Comparing Bidding Strategies across Stages
Expressions (1) and (2) indicate that the bidding strategies di¤er from stage to stage in our model, and the interval over which the bidding strategy is de…ned also changes over stages. For instance while the …rst round equilibrium is de…ned on [c; c], the second round equilibrium is de…ned on the interval [c; s 1 ]; which is truncated from above compared to the …rst round. While the secret reserve price is not revealed, the rejected lowest bid from the previous round gives bidders information that the secret reserve price is below this bid; bidders will not submit their bids above this lowest bid.
Intuitively, this would make bidders bid more aggressively and reduce their bids over stages. This is indeed the case, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 In the multi-round auction model, the equilibrium bid in stage j is less than or equal to the equilibrium bid in the previous stage everywhere on [c; s j 1 ]; i.e., j (c) j 1 (c):
A few remarks follow. First, this proposition shows that the equilibrium bidding strategies are indeed decreasing from stage to stage if the contract is not sold out. Moreover, the reduction is universal on the whole common interval. Second, this result is established allowing for the private cost distributions to vary across stages. Thus it is a strong prediction from the model as it is robust to the change of the bidders'cost distribution over stages. Third, this result is empirically testable and can be used for testing rationality of bidders in real auctions.
Numerical Examples
To explore more properties of the bidding functions across stages, we give some numerical examples.
We specify di¤erent distributions and vary the number of potential bidders. As the analytical solutions are in general not attainable, we numerically solve for equilibrium bids. Without loss of generality, we illustrate 1 (c) and 2 (c): The bidding functions under di¤erent speci…cations are depicted in …gure set 1 (…gure 1-1 -1-3).
The depicted curves reinforce two main …ndings from the theoretical model. First, the bidding functions are strictly increasing. Second, the bids in the second round are everywhere below the bids in the …rst round on the common support. We conduct a large number of numerical speci…cations and these …ndings are generally consistent.
The graphs also reveal some other interesting patterns. First, the bids are negatively related to the number of potential bidders in every round. This is simply because of the competition e¤ ect.
Second, the disparity between 1 (c) and 2 (c) are a¤ected by two factors. On one hand, it is a¤ected by the number of potential bidders. The di¤erence between them shrinks as the number of potential bidders increases. This is reasonable because as the number of potential bidders increases, the competition e¤ ect becomes more intense, which makes a bidder's mark-up in every auction round small and converging. On the other hand, it is a¤ected by the lowest bid in the …rst round of unsold auction. The smaller this lowest bid is, the larger the di¤erence between 1 (c) and 2 (c):
We label this e¤ect as boundary e¤ ect. In the …rst round, the boundary condition is at the upper bound of the cost distribution, while in the second round the boundary condition is at the previous lowest bid (upper bound of a truncated distribution). The lower the truncated bound is, the lower the maximum possible bid in the second round is. Hence the boundary e¤ ect tends to enlarge the di¤erence in bidding across stages.
Government' s Information Revelation
In this section we compare welfare impacts of di¤erent reserve price release policies from the government. Motivated by the INDOT data feature, our model has focused on the use of the secret reserve price by the government. Alternatively, the government can make the engineer's estimate public and use it as a public reserve price. In this scenario, the government can …nd no bids submitted if all bidders' private costs are above the public reserve price. If we maintain the random cost replacement assumption, then the government can re-auction the project in the next round with the same public reserve price. As a result, under the random cost replacement assumption, the multi-round feature can be accommodated by both secret and public reserve prices. It would be interesting to compare the welfare implications of these two mechanisms and gain insights on why secret reserve prices are used in auctions.
Multi-Round Auctions with Public Reserve Prices
We maintain all the assumptions made in Section 2.1 except that now the reserve price r 0 is public.
In the j-th round, the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy, as shown in Riley and Samuelson (1981) , is given by
for c < r 0 ; for a potential bidder whose private cost is above r 0 , he will not bid.
If all potential bidders'private costs are above r 0 , no bids are submitted at the current round, and the project can be re-auctioned in the next round. As in the secret reserve price case, we assume that the set of potential bidders remains the same across stages. At each round, however, a bidder's bidding strategy as de…ned in (3) may change because of the new private cost he re-draws from F j ( ).
The Comparison of Mechanisms
We compare the government's ex ante expected payments under the two reserve price policies, assuming that bidders re-draw their private costs at each round, and the government will re-auction the unsold contract in the next round until it is sold out. Since it is infeasible to make such a comparison generally as the ex ante expected payments in these two cases do not have closed form expressions in general, we conduct some simulation studies by assuming that the private cost distribution remains the same across stages, and by considering some commonly used functional forms for the private cost distribution and the reserve price distribution such as the uniform and exponential distributions.
We specify di¤erent distributions and vary the number of potential bidders to carry out a group of simulations. We then compare the government's expected expenditures under the two mechanisms.
We …rst plot the simulated expected expenditure as a function of the reserve price. As can be seen from the graphs, under some speci…cations, the secret reserve price policy dominates the public reserve price in that the (ex post) expected expenditure under the secret reserve price is below that under the public reserve price. Some other speci…cations, however, yield the opposite …ndings. We further compute the ex ante expected expenditures by integrating out the reserve prices and report them in Table 3 , which reveals that the expected expenditure under secret reserve prices is sometimes lower and sometimes higher than under public reserve prices.
The graphs also reveal some other interesting patterns. First, the (ex post) expected expenditure as a function of either a secret or public reserve price is almost increasing with the reserve price 9 .
This is reasonable because the higher is the reserve price, the less restrictive is the auction to the bidders. The acceptable bids are high when the reserve prices are high. Second, the e¤ect of the number of bidders is complicated. On one hand, the larger the number of bidders, the closer the two curves are because of the competition that tends to o¤set the di¤erent e¤ects of di¤erent reserve prices on bidding. This competition e¤ect is in analogy to that in the earlier numerical results on equilibrium bids between stages. On the other hand, the minimum bid in the previous round is lowered by the intensity of competition in the case of a secret reserve price. This is a factor that drags down the bids in the auctions with secret reserve prices, which does not exist in the public reserve price mechanism. The boundary e¤ect favors the secret reserve price. It a¤ects the position of the intersection and the di¤erence of the two curves. Consequently, the boundary e¤ect tends to enlarge the favorable range for the secret reserve price and increase the distance between the two curves in its favorable range. The net e¤ect is determined by the combination. It seems that the competition e¤ect often dominates from the graphs.
Reduced-Form Empirical Analyses
In this section, we provide a preliminary analysis of our data, trying to relate our theoretical model to the data by justifying some assumptions, and to test some predictions from the model. 10
Exogeneity of Number of Potential bidders in the First Round and the Reserve Price
In our model, we assume that there is no entry in the …rst round. In other words, the set of potential bidders is identical to that of actual bidders. To justify this assumption, we take a look at the number of bidders in the …rst round and test the exogeneity of this variable. To this end, we use both the Poisson model and the negative binomial model as the number of bidders is a count variable. Using all data in the …rst round including both sold lettings and unsold lettings,
we estimate both models. Since in our data set, we do not have any auction that has no bidder participation, the number of bidders in our data is truncated from zero. Thus we use the truncated Poisson and negative binomial models.
The ML estimation results of both models are reported in Table 4 . The results show that no covariates used in the regression are statistically signi…cant in explaining the number of bidders.
Thus, the number of actual bidders can be treated exogenous and considered the same as the number of potential bidders.
Another important assumption in the theoretical model is that the government's reserve price is exogenous in that it is not related to the number of bidders and does not change across di¤erent rounds. To test the exogeneity of the reserve price in our data, we run a regression of the logarithm of the reserve price on a set of covariates including the number of bidders. From the results reported in Table 5 , we can see that interestingly, both the number of bidders and the round-two dummy are not signi…cant in the regression. 11 That both the number of bidders and round-two dummy have 1 0 While our model is general enough to allow for possibility of in…nite rounds, we can only focus on analyzing the …rst two rounds because of our data limitation. 1 1 "round-two" is a dummy variable equal to 0 when an auction is in the …rst round and 1 when an auction is in the second round.
no e¤ect on the reserve price provides support for the exogeneity of the reserve price.
Regression Analysis of Bids
There are two empirically testable implications about the equilibrium bids from our theoretical model. First, it can be easily veri…ed that the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategies given by (1) and (2) are monotone decreasing with the number of potential bidders. Intuitively, the larger the number of bidders, the more competitive the auction. The competition drives the bidders to bid more aggressively. Second, the theoretical model predicts that the equilibrium bids are lower in the second stage.
To test these two implications, we run a pooled regression of the logarithm of bids on a set of covariates. To allow for structural change in bid over the two auction rounds, which is indicated by the theoretical model, we include the round-two dummy variable and its interactions with other variables. We report the regression results in Table 6 . It turns out that the number of bidders is strongly signi…cant and negatively related to bids. The round-two dummy and some interactive terms are strongly signi…cant, meaning that there exists structural change in bid across auction stages. Furthermore, we calculate the marginal e¤ect of the round-two dummy on the bids. The marginal e¤ect is -$53004 and strongly signi…cant, meaning that on average the bidders tend to lower their bids in the second round by $53,004 which is about 8.3% of the project value. This result is quite close to the outcome in the summary statistics. These …ndings o¤er support to our theoretical model.
The R 2 of the pooled regression is 0.51, indicating that on the one hand the model …ts moderately well, on the other hand we may ignore some unobserved auction heterogeneity. To further ascertain the existence of unobserved auction heterogeneity, we conduct a random-e¤ect panel data analysis using only the …rst round auction data, as the auction data have a panel feature. We report the regression results in Table 7 . The results strongly indicate that there exists unobserved auction heterogeneity as the error variance from the unobserved heterogeneity accounts for 95% of the total error variance. Hence it calls for controlling the unobserved heterogeneity in the structural inference.
6 Structural Inference of Muti-Round Auction Models
The Parameterization of the Structural Model
Based on the theoretical auction model, there are three primitives, namely, the government's reserve price distribution G( ) and the private cost distributions F j ( ), j = 1; 2. F 1 ( ) can be in general di¤erent from F 2 ( ). Nonparametrically, G( ) can be identi…ed from the observed reserve prices as they are assumed to be random draws from G( ). Moreover, following Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) and Li and Perrigne (2003) , it can be veri…ed that F 1 ( ) is identi…ed over its entire support [c; c] by the observed bids in the …rst round, and F 2 ( ) is identi…ed over [c; s 1 ] by the observed bids in the second round. In this paper, however, we adopt the parametric approach because we only observe 30 auctions in the second round, which makes nonparametric estimation problematic.
In an econometric framework, asymptotic statistical inference is based on a large number of auctions. Let L 1 be the number of auctions that transact in the …rst round, L 2 be the number of auctions that transact in the second round. For the`-th auction at the j-th round, let G`( );
F j`( ) and F j`( ) denote each primitive distribution respectively with corresponding densities g`( ) and f j`( ), j = 1; 2. Assume that G`= G( jx`; u`; ) and F j`= F ( jx`; u`; j ), where x`is a vector of variables that we use to control for the observed auction heterogeneity, and u`is a scalar variable that represents the unobserved auction heterogeneity, both a¤ecting the government's reserve price as well as the bidders' costs, is a vector of unknown parameters in R K , and is a vector of unknown parameters in R K : We assume that u is independent of x, and has a distribution W ( j ) with w( j ) being the density function, where is a vector of unknown parameter in R m :
Conditional on both observed and unobserved heterogeneity x and u, we specify the reserve price distribution and the cost distribution as exponential as follows
where c 2 (0; 1) and r 2 (0; 1). By including the intercept in x, we normalize the unobserved heterogeneity term u such that E[u] = 0: We assume that u N (0; 2 ), where 2 is an unknown parameter.
Structural Equilibrium Solutions
Next we need to solve the theoretical auction model for equilibrium solutions with the above speci…ed distributions. The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in the …rst round is given as follows, which is a closed-form solution
The Bayesian Nash equilibrium bidding strategy in the second round, which is a solution to the equation given below, does not have a closed form.
Estimation and Testing for Changes of Private Cost Distributions
In our auction data, at round j; j = 1; 2, we observe reserve prices, number of potential bidders and a set of auction heterogeneities (r`; N`; x`). We also observe bids in round 1 and round 2, respectively. Our estimation of the structural parameters is based on the likelihood function of r given in (4) and the moment conditions of b ji`( j = 1; 2), where b ji`d enoted the i-th bid in the`-th auction at the j-th round. Speci…cally, from (6) we obtain the moment condition
for the equilibrium bids b 1i`i n the …rst auction round. Similarly, from (7) we can obtain E[b 2i`j c s 1 ; N`; g`( ); x`; u`] m 2 (b 2i`; x`; u`; ; ; 2 )
for the equilibrium bids b 2i`i n the second round, where m 2 (b 2i`; x`; u`; ; ; 2 ) does not have a closed form because the second round bidding function does not have a closed form.
Note (4), (8) and (9) are all conditional on u`which is not observed. For estimation, however, we need to obtain conditions that depend only on observables. In order to derive such conditions, we integrate u`out of (4), (8) and (9) and get the followings.
g`(rjx`; ;
The parameters of primary interests are ; 1 ; 2 and . We estimate them using (10), (11) and (12).
A Two-Step Estimation Approach
We adopt a two-step estimation strategy. In the …rst step, we recover and using likelihood function (10) to get b and b . In the second step, we estimate 1 and 2 using moment conditions (11) and (12) as well as the estimates b and b .
Since we fully specify the distribution of the reserve price and we observe reserve prices, in the …rst step, and can be e¢ ciently estimated by maximum likelihood (ML) approach. A complication arises from the feature that there is no closed form likelihood function because of the integration with respect to u`. Thus, we use a simulated maximum likelihood (SML) estimation approach (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) ). Speci…cally, the SML estimator is de…ned by
where L = L 1 +L 2 . As indicated in (13), we use the importance sampling technique in the numerical integration. The importance density function is the standard normal ( ): We draw S of u s s from ( ) in simulation, where S is su¢ ciently large compared to the sample size L: As S; L ! 1 and p L=S ! 0, the SML estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the ML estimator (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) ).
In the second step, we separately estimate 1 and 2 , using moment conditions (11) and (12), respectively, and the estimates b and b obtained in the …rst step. Again because of the presence of the unobserved heterogeneity, we propose a method of simulated moments estimator (MSM). Let
. We need to simulate M j (b ji`; x`; b ; b ; j ), hence we draw u s from w( jb ) and de…ne y s ji`( j ) = b ji` m j (b ji`; x`; u s ; b ; b ; j ). For each j (= 1; 2), a MSM estimator can be de…ned by
where is a K K symmetric positive-de…nite weighting matrix.
Additional di¢ culty in computation arises from the fact that the simulated M j (b ji`; x`; b ; b ; j )
involves the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium strategy, which is especially cumbersome for j = 2, because it does not have a closed form solution. We follow Elyakime, La¤ont, Loisel and Vuong (1994) to numerically recover the bidding function by a recursive procedure. Starting from the boundary condition, the equilibrium bidding strategy can be numerically solved in a recursive manner. Note that the resulting MSM estimator is consistent given that the …rst-step estimators b and b are consistent.
Noting the complexity involved in our two-step estimation procedure, we use bootstrap to obtain variance-covariance matrices of the estimates. Because of the panel feature of the auction data, we adopt a block bootstrap (e.g. Andrews (2002) ) to obtain the standard errors for our two-stage MSM estimator.
Testing for Cross-Stage Change of Private Cost Distributions
In the previous section, we develop a framework of estimating the structural model of multi-round auctions separately round by round, allowing for the underlying cost distributions to change across two rounds. It would be interesting to test whether the underlying cost distributions change or not across stages. If it turns out that the distributions do not change, it means that bidders re-draw their costs from the same distribution across stages. Moreover, in this case, we can more e¢ ciently estimate the private cost distribution parameters by jointly estimating both auction rounds.
We propose a formal test following Andrews and Fair (1988) , who extend the Chow test of structural changes in classical linear models (Chow (1960) ) to test structural changes in nonlinear models. The null hypothesis here is H 0 : 1 = 2 , which is the case of testing for pure structural change (see Andrews and Fair (1988) ). The Wald test statistic is applicable to our MSM estimator, which can be implemented as follows. First, the MSM in (14) is implemented as discussed previously.
Let 1 = L 1 =L and 2 = L 2 =L. Then, the Wald test statistic is given by
where b V 1 and b V 2 are the estimated asymptotic variances matrices of b 1 and b 2 respectively, b V 12 is the matrix of the estimated asymptotic covariances between b 1 and b 2 : The general inverse ( ) of covariance term in the middle equals the regular inverse ( ) 1 with probability going to one as L ! 1. W follows a 2 distribution with the dimension of the structural parameter vector as its degrees of freedom.
Results
In this section, we apply our structural econometric approach to analyze the data from the INDOT, so as to uncover the underlying private cost and reserve price distributions. By concentrating on a speci…c type of bridge work, we choose a set of observed covariates x = fdbe, time, np, steel, length, interceptg. First we use the two-stage estimation to estimate the model under unobserved auction heterogeneity. Then we test the cross-stage change of private cost distributions. Lastly, we conduct a robustness check.
SML and MSM Estimates for the Structural Parameters and the Unobserved Heterogeneity
The parameters of the reserve price distribution and the parameter of the unobserved heterogeneity can be jointly estimated based on (13). We draw a large sample, namely S = 1000, of u s s from N (0; 1), i:e:, (u`); and adopt importance sampling to implement the SML. Furthermore, we gain the standard errors through bootstrap. The results are reported in Table 8 .
Next we estimate parameters in private cost distributions j (for j = 1; 2) based on (14). To gain the simulated moments, we recursively solve for equilibrium bids and calculate the numerical integration. We simulate u l from N (0; b 2 ): Here the number of u s s that we draw is S = 100, a number relatively smaller than the one we use in implementing SML, as an MSM estimator is consistent for any …xed number of simulations (Gourieroux and Monfort (1996) ). Furthermore, we use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix. Using bootstrap, we obtain the standard errors of the estimates. Moreover, as we need to incorporate the variation from the estimation of b and b ; we jointly resample the auction data including both reserve prices and bids and repeat the SML estimation and MSM estimation simultaneously. The results of the estimation are reported in the …rst four columns of Table 9 .
The results indicate that all variables that we pick up have signi…cant e¤ects on private costs.
Evaluated at the sample mean of the observed and unobserved auction characteristics, the mean private cost is about $641,000. Increases in the length of the bridges and the time needed to accomplish the projects raise private costs, and in turn increase bids, as expected. Speci…cally, holding all the other factors constant, increasing the length of the project by one meter (or 3.28 feet) will increase the mean private cost by 0.21% or about $1,350. One more working day needed for a project will increase the mean private cost approximately by 0.42% or $2,700. Furthermore, rising in the DBE percentage results in higher private cost. This is reasonable because higher DBE percentage increases the primary contractor's transaction cost in a project by …nding and subcontracting partial work to a DBE …rm. More speci…cally, one unit increase in DBE will increase the mean private cost by about 4% or slightly more than $25,700. An interesting pattern shows di¤erent e¤ects of the number of projects (np) on the government's reserve price and the bidders'
costs. Increasing the number of projects involved in one contract tends to raise the government's valuation of the work, but to lower the bidders'costs. This is because a bidder, while undertaking the projects, will consider the economic scale of taking multi-projects on multi-sites in neighborhood that reduces his cost. The government may not take the e¤ect of economic scale into account since it does not assume the work anyway. This explains why we see a negative e¤ect of np on the private costs, but a positive e¤ect on the reserve price. Moreover, one unit increase in the number of projects can save the …rm's private cost on average by about 3.9% which is slightly less than $25,000. Bridges of a steel structure cause about $180,000 more than bridges of other structures on the mean private cost. Furthermore, the estimate of the unobserved heterogeneity parameter is strongly signi…cant, meaning that there exists unobserved auction heterogeneity in our data set.
Testing for Cross-Stage Change of Private Cost Distributions
To implement the test, we estimate the bidding equations separately round by round and obtain b 1 and b 2 . We then compute the W statistic, which is 1.45. Thus the null hypothesis is not rejected at a 5% signi…cance level. It implies that a bidder re-draws his private cost from the same cost distribution across di¤erent auction rounds.
In this case, we re-estimate in view of 1 = 2 = by utilizing this restriction in the MSM estimation to obtain a more e¢ cient estimate. The results are reported in the last two columns of Table 9 . In sections that follow we use these estimates for inference.
Robustness Check
We take the estimate of the parameter of the unobserved auction heterogeneity b from the …rst-stage estimation for granted in the second-stage, assuming that the unobserved auction heterogeneities are from the same distribution for both the auctioneer and the bidders. Although this is mainly for simplifying computation (particularly for those of the second round auctions), we can empirically check its validity. We estimate the parameter of the unobserved heterogeneity in (14) jointly with the parameters of the private cost distribution and obtain e . We then compare b and e . It turns out that b and e are very close (0.054 and 0.055), which validates the assumption.
Counterfactual Analysis
In this section we investigate welfare impacts of di¤erent reserve price release policies on the government. Motivated by the INDOT data feature, our model has focused on the use of the secret reserve price by the government. Alternatively, the government can make the engineer's estimate public and use it as a public reserve price. In this scenario, the government can …nd no bids submitted if all bidders'private costs are above the public reserve price. If we maintain the random cost replacement assumption, then the government can re-auction the project in the next round with the same public reserve price. As a result, under the random cost replacement assumption, the multi-round feature can be accommodated by both secret and public reserve prices. It would be interesting to compare the welfare implications of these two mechanisms using a counterfactual analysis. Such a comparison allows us to evaluate the INDOT's auction mechanism and assess the e¢ ciency of its current reserve price policy. Moreover, it o¤ers insight on why secret reserve prices are used in auctions. Since we have uncovered the underlying structural elements, we can conduct simulations under the two di¤erent reserve price release policies and compare the government's payment under the two di¤erent scenarios.
We construct a representative auction by setting all observed characteristics at the sample means of the corresponding covariates. The simulation results are reported in Table 10 . The expected procurement cost is $537,689 under the public reserve price, $524,048 under the secret reserve price. The di¤erence is strongly signi…cant. The INDOT on average can save $13,641, or 2.5% of the project value, on a typical bridge work auction by adopting a secret reserve price, thereby saving millions of dollars of budgets on all highway projects yearly. On the other hand, the di¤erence in the probability of no sale is 10%. The INDOT undergoes a no sale risk of 10% greater by adopting a secret reserve price. However, it comes with a large standard error and therefore statistically insigni…cant. Moreover, in practice the highway contracts are often sold out within two rounds, the cost saved by adopting the secret reserve price outweighs the no sale risk caused.
Hence our …ndings indicate that the use of secret reserve price may be a good policy in practice in procurement auctions. 12
Conclusion
In this paper, we study multi-round auctions with secret reserve prices. Our model yields some
predictions that can be empirically tested, such as that the equilibrium bids decline uniformly over various stages. Also, our simulation study of the model demonstrates that depending on the speci…cations of the underlying distributions, the auctioneer may be better o¤ by keeping the reserve price secret, which is the case in our data that motivates our study. Thus our model has the potential to be used to explain why, in some real world auctions, secret reserve prices are used.
We develop a structural approach to analyze the INDOT data. The structural approach recovered the distributions of the reserve prices and the private cost. The estimates for structural parameters allow us to conduct counterfactual analyses. We …nd that the INDOT could have signi…cantly saved budgets by adopting a secret reserve price rather than using a public reserve price.
Our paper o¤ers insight on the use of secret reserve prices in multi-round auctions and the strategic changes in bidders'bidding strategies. It is worth noting, on the other hand, that our model is a static model with non-forward looking bidders. We make this assumption to simplify the analysis and to accommodate the ‡exibility of allowing for changes of bidders' private cost distributions 1 2 McAfee and McMillan (1992) have argued that secret reserve prices can be used for preventing collusions.
across stages. Alternatively, one can introduce dynamic features into the model by assuming that bidders are forward looking and their private cost distributions do not change across stages. Ji and Li (2006) propose a dynamic model of multi-round auctions with secret reserve prices and develop a structural approach. Appendix 1. Lemma 1 In the …rst stage, bidder i 0 s probability of winning is
while in the j-th stage, bidder i 0 s probability of winning is
Proof bidder i wins the auction if his bid is less than the other N 1 bids as well as the reserve price. The probability of winning can be described by occurrence of the following event, Pr(b i1 < min k6 =i (b k1 ) and b i1 < r 0 ), which is a joint probability. Because the pair wise independence of agents, it is a product of Pr(b i1 < r 0 ) and Pr(b i1 < b k1 ); 8k 6 = i: At equilibrium if the bidders play the symmetric bidding strategy, then (c i1 ) < (c k1 ) implies c i1 < c k1 :
In the j-th stage, the information from previous auction rounds enables the bidders to form a Bayesian updated belief of r 0 : Therefore the probability that b ij is less than r 0 is contingent on the past information set j 1 , i.e., Pr(b ij < r 0 j j 1 ), where s j 1 is the lowest bid from the previous auction round. Henceforth r 0 < s j 1 ; is the information set j 1 : bidders bid as if they saw r 0 drawn from a truncated distribution G(rjr < s j 1 ): It then leads to the following result. Pr(b ij < r 0 j j 1 ) = 1 Pr(r 0 < b ij jr 0 < s j 1 ) = 1
Similarly, the probability of winning is based on Pr(b ij < min k6 =i (b kj ) and b ij < r 0 ); a joint probability. Thus the result immediately follows.
2. Proof of Proposition 1 De…ne ( ) as the symmetric increasing Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bidding strategy. Since it is the same function for each bidder, we could suppress the subscript i: We index the strategy in j-th stage by j : We solve the game stage by stage to obtain the separate equilibrium. In the …rst stage, the bidder chooses b 1 to maximize his expected payo¤
Where b 1 = 1 (c) and c = 1 1 (b 1 ): After we replace b 1 with the function of c, we get the di¤erential equation for 1 :
Further algebraic manipulation turns the di¤erential equation into
The boundary condition is 1 (c) = c: The probability of winning for the bidder with c is zero because obviously c is the highest possible cost a bidder may have. As F 1 ( ) is a well de…ned cumulative probability distribution function, F 1 (c) = 1: Bidding more than c de…nitely loses the auction , while bidding less than c can incur strictly negative payo¤. Therefore 1 (c) = c is weakly dominant strategy. Integrate it over [c; c], using the boundary condition, we get
1 (c) is increasing, under regular conditions, second order condition satis…ed, 1 (c) is the optimal bidding strategy. This implies that given all bidders bid following this bidding function, no one can be better o¤ by deviation. Therefore it is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In any j-th reauction stage, the bidder maximize his expected payo¤ in the j-th round, as follows.
M ax
the …rst order condition for maximizing j is
In equilibrium, we obtain the di¤erential equation for j
Then it can be written as
The boundary condition is di¤erent here. It involves participation decision of the bidder.
Entry to the j-th round auction occurs only if a bidder's private cost in j-th round is less than s j 1 . Hence the above strategy is conditional on that the private cost is less than s j 1 . With the same argument as in the …rst stage, we can establish the boundary condition j (s j 1 ) = s j 1 for this stage. Integrate over [c; s j 1 ], using the boundary condition, to get the following.
and that is
for which to hold, it must be that
Therefore it must be j (c) j 1 (c):
4. Derivation of the Structural Equilibrium Bidding Function For the exponential distribution, F (c) = 1 exp( c= exp(x + u)); G(r) = 1 exp( r= exp(x + u)); 1 F (c) = exp( c= exp(x + u)); 1 G(r) = exp( r= exp(x + u)); substitute them into equation (1).
We use contraction mapping to solve it. We start with a conjecture of 1 (c), say 
The last equality obtained when we use the boundary condition of 1 (c) = c, particularly in limit in this case lim Note: Weib refers to weibull distribution; Beta refers to Beta distribution; logn refers to log normal distribution. In each subplot, the contractor's distribution is put in the first place. 
